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II. Poaching, Trafficking and Human Security 
 
Rosaleen Duffy and Jasper Humphreys  
 
Human security and underdevelopment are increasingly common themes in public debates 
about the security threat posed by illegal wildlife trade (IWT). Most frequently highlighted 
are the ways in which IWT can exacerbate poverty, by stripping local communities of the 
wildlife that tourists will pay to see. Such narratives, however, are oversimplified, 
underpinned by a series of assumptions around the circumstances and livelihoods strategies 
of populations in source areas, and around the role of wildlife tourism in rural development. 
Such narratives do not adequately address the reasons why poaching occurs in the first 
place, or the extent to which current responses to poaching themselves serve to ameliorate 
or threaten human security. This chapter examines the most common characterisations of 
the threat to human security and development posed by IWT, questioning the extent to 
which these accurately reflect evidence of the range of threats that play out on the ground.  
 
The Human Impact of IWT 
Current understandings of the impact of IWT on human security and development form part 
of a field of enquiry that is still developing. This field emerged in the late 1990s as part of a 
push to move beyond traditional, narrow definitions of national security that focused on the 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?1 Defining human 
security, for the purposes of this chapter, is far from easy; different approaches to and 
understandings of the term are often proffered by the particular academic discipline or type 
of organisation (whether government, international organisation or NGO) looking to use it.2 
For example, it first depends on the underlying definition of what constitutes security, 
requires a shift in thinking from states to individuals/people as the main object of analysis 
and indicates the shift in thinking (from the end of the Cold War) that threats are primarily 
definined in military terms.3 However, a useful working definition is provided by Karen 
K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ:ŽŶĂƌŶĞƚƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƐŽŶŚƵŵĂŶƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) Project at the University of Oslo. 
which ran from 1999 to 2010,4 ?K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚĂƌŶĞƚƚanchor the concept of human security in 
ŵĂƌƚǇĂ^ĞŶ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛaspirations and how these 
can be met.5 ƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶ^ĞŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? encompass not only economics, but also power, 
ǀŽŝĐĞĂŶĚĂŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? /ŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ ?K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ
                                                        
1
 <ĂƌĞŶK ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ:ŽŶĂƌŶĞƚƚ ? ‘'ůŽďĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources (No. 38, 2013), p. 373. 
2
 K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚĂƌŶĞƚƚ ? ‘'ůŽďĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
3
  There are substantial debates on security and human security, useful overviews are in: Suhrke A. 
1999. Human security and the interests of states. Security Dialogue 30:265 W76 
Commission on Human Security  2003. Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People. New 
York: UN; Ken Booth, 1991. Security and emancipation. Review of International Studies  17:313 W26 
DĂƚƚŚĞǁZ ?DĐŽŶĂůĚ ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚ: ?K ?ƌŝĞŶ< ?ĞĚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Global Environmental Change and Human 
Security. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Lipschutz, R. 1995. On Security. New York: Columbia University 
Press; Dalby S. 2009. Security and Environmental Change. Cambridge: Polity 
4
 http://www.gechs.org/ (accessed 26.08.16) 
5
 Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). 
Barnett suggest that human security is a condition in which people and communities have 
the capacity to respond to threats to their basic needs and rights so that they can live with 
dignity.6   
 
Following this line of argument, in their review of the links between poverty and poaching, 
Duffy, St John, Buscher and Brockington (2015) argue that it is important to place 
motivations for poaching and smuggling within a wider context, and take account of a more 
expansive definition of poverty as not just material deprivation, but also a lack of voice or 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶůŝĨĞƉĂƚŚ ?ƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ
or smuggling need to about sustainable development and cannot be achieved solely by the 
use of technical or narrowly economic approaches. For example, provision of a limited 
amount of paid employment via tourism initiatives is unlikely to have a significant impact on 
rates of poaching and smuggling because the benefits are not widely disbursed enough, and 
because such interventions do not tackle the wider factors that produce poverty and 
inequality in the first place (Duffy, St John, Buscher and Brockington, 2015; Duffy and St. 
John, 2013). 
Increasing attention to the intersections between human security and environmental 
change has resulted from a growing realisation that environmental degradation impacts 
upon the ability of people to meet their needs and to live well. A similar trend has occurred 
in relation to IWT specifically, and it is now often suggested that IWT has a straightforwardly 
negative impact on human security in and around source areas. It is assumed that this 
occurs as IWT removes the often-iconic wildlife that is key to tourism or community 
conservation schemes. These, in turn, it is emphasised, often form the only source of income 
in remote rural areas suffering high rates of poverty and a lack of access to other economic 
opportunities.  
 
This argument forms a core part of calls to action by national governments in source and 
transit states, development and conservation NGOs and international organisations, as well 
as featuring frequently in mainstream media narratives. The 2014 London Conference on 
the Illegal Wildlife Trade  W an international conference that brought together global leaders 
in an effort to inject high-level political commitment into efforts to tackle IWT  W formally 
recognised the negative impact of IWT on sustainable livelihoods; the resulting London 
ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚĞ ĂƐ  ‘Ă ŵĂũŽƌ ďĂƌƌŝĞƌ ƚŽsustainable, inclusive and balanced 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?7 The Declaration went on to acknowledge the impact of the trade 
ŽŶ  ‘ƌĞĚƵĐ ?ŝŶŐ ?  ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ĞĂƌŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ǁŝůĚůŝĨĞ ?ďĂƐĞĚ
tourism... which can make a significant contribution to local livelihoods and national 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?dŚŝƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ?ŝƚŶŽƚĞĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞ ‘ƌŽďƐ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ
of their natural capital and cultural heritagĞ ?  ? ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ ůŝǀĞůŝŚŽŽĚƐ ŽĨ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů
                                                        
6
 K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚĂƌŶĞƚƚ ? ‘'ůŽďĂůŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŚĂŶŐĞĂŶĚ,ƵŵĂŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
7
  ‘>ŽŶĚŽŶ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ /ůůĞŐĂů tŝůĚůŝĨĞ dƌĂĚĞ ?  ? ? W ? ? &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? P ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/281289/london-
wildlife-conference-declaration-140213.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2016. 
resource dependent communities ... [and] damages the health of the ecosystems they 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?8  
 
The follow-up to the London Conference, held in Kasane, Botswana in 2015, emphasised 
ƚŚĂƚ ?  ‘Ɛ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ŝůůĞŐĂů ǁŝůĚůŝĨĞ ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ůŽƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽĂĐŚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ĂƌĞ ƐƚĞĂůŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞŵ ?  Wwhilst 
also recognising that the impact on communities  ‘ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ďetter understood and 
ƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?9 Meanwhile, proclaiming 3 March World Wildlife Day in 2013, the UN General 
ƐƐĞŵďůǇƌĞĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐǀĂůƵĞŽĨǁŝůĚůŝĨĞĂŶĚŝƚƐǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŝƚƐ
ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and 
aesthetic contributions to sustainable development and human well-ďĞŝŶŐ ? ?10  Media 
content, where it considers the human impact of wildlife trafficking, focuses predominantly 
on the loss of tourist revenues by dependent local communities. The key points usually 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ? ŚĞƌĞ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂ ? ĂƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ /td ?  ‘ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌĂƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƐƚƌŝĐŬĞŶƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁŝůůďĞůŽƐƚ ? ?11 Numerous other 
articles focus similarly on the ƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘dŚĞ ĞǆƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ĐĂŶ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ Ă ůŽĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƚŽƵƌŝƐŵ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?  ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞůŝĞƐ ŽŶ ŝƚƐ
wildlife to attract tourists is at great risk for economic hardship if the prevalence of poaching 
ŝƐŚŝŐŚ ? ?12 
 
These assessments are not necessarily inaccurate. IWT can indeed impact upon human 
security in these ways. The hunting of wildlife through organised commercial poaching 
operations can remove an important resource for local communities: wildlife may be part of 
community-based conservation schemes that generate important local revenues, in turn 
enhancing food and other forms of income and non-income security in marginalised areas. A 
range of attempts has been made to illustrate the ramifications of this process. The iWorry 
campaign by the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust is a good example. The campaign notes that 
in Kenya, wildlife tourism generates 12 per cent of GDP, 300,000 jobs, and raised $47 million 
in national-park entrance fees in 2012 alone.13 It then seeks to compare the value of a living 
versus a dead elephant, arguing that alive a single elephant can contribute up to $22,966 
annually to the tourism industry  W around $1.6 million over its lifetime, compared to an 
average one-off total of $21,000 for its tusks (in end markets).14  
 
However, there is also evidence to suggest that this characterisation does not represent the 
full picture. Though there is little published work on the reasons people engage in illegal 
                                                        
8
 Ibid. 
9
  ‘<ĂƐĂŶĞ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ /ůůĞŐĂů tŝůĚůŝĨĞ dƌĂĚĞ ?  ? ? DĂƌĐŚ  ? ? ? ? P ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?  ? ? ? ? ?
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417231/kasane-
statement-150325.pdf>, accessed 15 July 2016. 
10
 /d^ ? ‘UN General Assembly ProclĂŝŵƐ ?DĂƌĐŚĂƐtŽƌůĚtŝůĚůŝĨĞĂǇ ? ?ƉƌĞƐƐƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ?23 December 
2013. 
11
 &ŝŶ ? ? ? ‘ZŚŝŶŽWŽĂĐŚŝŶŐdŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐdŽƵƌŝƐŵ ?ĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
12
 KƌŝĞƚƚĂƐƚƌĂĚĂ ? ‘dŚĞĞǀĂƐƚĂƚŝŶŐĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨtŝůĚůŝĨĞWŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ? ?One Green Planet, 6 January 2014. 
13
 iworry,  ‘ĞĂĚŽƌůŝǀĞ PsĂůƵŝŶŐĂŶůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14
 Ibid. 
hunting and trafficking of wildlife, there is growing evidence to suggest that IWT can in fact, 
somewhat counterintuitively, have a positive impact on human security, making the 
situation more complex than the narrative above would suggest. This is precisely because 
proactive engagement in poaching and trafficking of a range of wildlife and wildlife products 
can itself meet subsistence needs or constitute an important source of income for some 
marginalised and vulnerable communities around the world.15 For example, accoding to the 
Rainforest Foundation UK forest-dependent peoples such as the Baka, Aka, Bagyeli, Bakola 
and Batwa in the Congo Basin have traditionally engaged in illegal hunting and fishing in 
protected areas to meet their protein needs.16 Consumption of wildlife is critically important 
to their day-to-day survival, and increasing levels of enforcement are reported in the past to 
have led to malnutrition in some communities. 17 As Cooney et al point out IWT can be an 
important livelihood strategy for some communities.18 
 
Meanwhile, IWT can provide other benefits and respond to other motivations, beyond 
subsistence, on the part of local communities. These are often ignored in media and political 
narratives positioning IWT as a straightforward threat to development. Such narratives tend 
to rely on a very narrow, predominantly economic definition of poverty; in a systematic 
review of evidence of the links between poverty and biodiversity, 70 per cent of published 
papers that addressed poverty as part of conservation used income as the key measure.19 
While poverty certainly encompasses material deprivation, it is necessary to engage with a 
much more complex understanding of the phenomenon.  
 
Taking a human-security approach, poverty is more than just a matter of economic 
deprivation; it enĐŽŵƉĂƐƐĞƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?
and to lead a dignified life. /ĨǁĞƵƐĞK ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚĂƌŶĞƚƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝǀĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ
                                                        
15
 IUCN, SULi ? // ?  ? ƵƐƚƌŝĂŶ DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ŽĨ ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ dZ&&/ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ ŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ P
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞhƐĞŝŶŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐtŝůĚůŝĨĞƌŝŵĞ ? ?^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ
Report, 26 W28 February 2015, Glenburn Lodge, Muldersdrift, South Africa, 2015; Catrina Mackenzie, 
ŽůŝŶŚĂƉŵĂŶĂŶĚZĂũĂ^ĞŶŐƵƉƚĂ ? ‘^ƉĂƚŝĂůWĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨ/ůůĞŐĂůZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞǆƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ<ŝďĂůĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂů
WĂƌŬ ?hŐĂŶĚĂ ? ?Environmental Conservation (No. 39, 2011), pp. 38 W50. 
16
  A Pyhälä, A Osuna Orozco and S Counsell, Protected Areas in the Congo Basin: Failing Both People 
and Biodiversity? (London: Rainforest Foundation UK, 2016), pp.80-81; Also see Twinamatsiko et al. 
2014. Linking Conservation, Equity and Poverty Alleviation: Understanding profiles and motivations of 
resource users and local perceptions of governance at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda. 
IIED Research Report, London. 
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 A Pyhälä, A Osuna Orozco and S Counsell, Protected Areas in the Congo Basin: Failing Both People 
and Biodiversity? (London: Rainforest Foundation UK, 2016), pp.80-81; Also see IUCN, SULi, IIED, 
 ?ƵƐƚƌŝĂŶDŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚdZ&&/ ? ‘ĞǇŽŶĚŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ PŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?
'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞhƐĞŝŶŽŵďĂƚŝŶŐtŝůĚůŝĨĞƌŝŵĞ ? ?^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵZĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ? W28 
February 2015, Glenburn Lodge, Muldersdrift, South Africa, 2015; 
18
 Cooney, R. et al (2015) The Trade in Wildlife: A Framework to Improve Biodiversity and Livelihood 
Outcomes Geneva: International Trade Centre (ITC), xii, 29 pages (Technical paper) Doc. No.: SC-15-
311.E.; also see Roe, D. (ed). 2013. Biodiversity  Conservation and Poverty Alleviation: Exploring the 
Evidence for a Link. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.  
 
19
 ZŽĞ Ğƚ Ăů ? ?  ‘tŚŝĐŚ ŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ Žƌ ƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐ ŽĨ ŝŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ /ŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ tŚŝĐŚ ŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
WŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ? ? 
(and of human security)  W which in line with the work of Sen20 encompasses not only 
economiĐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĂůĂĐŬŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞ ?ǀŽŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
future and day-to-day activities  W21 then it is important to consider whether poaching and 
wildlife trafficking might also be driven by a need to affirm identity or gain prestige.22 In line 
with this, there is evidence to suggest that these activities may represent an act of 
resistance against rules that local communities regard as unfair or illegitimate.23 Indeed, 
little considered in the dominant narratives around poaching and human security is the fact 
that local communities may not agree with, or wish to conform to, rules set by national 
governments, NGOs or international conservation initiatives.  
 
The lack of consideration of prevailing narratives relates to the fact that IWT debates are 
often underpinned by a simple definition of poaching: namely, the hunting of any animal not 
permitted by the state or a private owner.24 dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚĂ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚ ŝƐ
one that is predominantly informed and shaped by colonial histories. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
colonial authorities often outlawed hunting with the use of snares and traps, the very 
techniques used by communities to meet their subsistence needs.25 While European sport 
hunters were portrayed as conservationists and respecters of wildlife, African hunting 
methods were instead presented as cruel and unsporting. Such images interlinked well with 
other colonial stereotypes of African communities as savage, uncivilised, barbaric and in 
need of European civilising missions,26 with colonial images of sportsmen versus poachers 
still discernible in calls for militarised responses to IWT, as discussed later in this chapter. 
 
These historical dynamics are reflected in many of the most common interpretations of 
subsistence versus commercial poaching today, even though hunting itself is hard to 
categorise in neat and discreet ways. The most common interpretation are that subsistence 
ƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐ  ‘ŚƵŶƚŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽƚ ? ?ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶďĂƐŝĐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ
traps and snares, because the target is small game, such as antelope. By contrast, 
commercial poachers are typically thought to operate within organised groups that target 
financially valuable species such as elephants and rhinos. Commercial poachers, it is widely 
assumed, use superior technologies to hunt, including firearms, GPS systems and mobile 
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phones.27 However, increasingly these simple categories do not reflect the changing and 
dynamic nature of illegal hunting. Subsistence hunters may use automatic wepaons, whiel 
commercial poachers may use traps and snares. For example, some forms of subsistence 
poaching have been transformed by the arrival of multinational mining and logging 
companies. In parts of Central and West Africa, this has facilitated the growth of commercial 
bushmeat trading through the introduction of roads which allow the transportation of meat 
to urban markets, or to feed demand for food from large commercial workforces in remote 
rural areas.28  
 
A number of cases point to the inadequacy of what are commonly viewed, at a policy level, 
as neutral definitions  W and the failure to take account of local attitudes to them. Dilys Roe 
et al illustrate the centrality of IWT to the livelihood strategies of some of the poorest 
communities in the world,29 but argue also that IWT can represent more than a simple 
ƐƵďƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƌŚŝŶŽ-poaching crisis, for example, is often attributed to 
poverty in Mozambique, ƐŝŶŐůĞĚ ŽƵƚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ /d^ ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Parties 16 in 2013.30 Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, despite 
the end of its long-running civil war in 1992. It shares a border with South Africa, one of the 
wealthiest countries on the continent, and is thought to constitute a major source of its 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƐƉŽĂĐŚĞƌƐĞŶƚĞƌ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂƚŽĂĐƋƵŝƌĞrhino horn that is 
then sold on for consumption in destination countries.  
 
The available information suggests that the economic rewards of poaching here can be 
significant: Ă ĨĞǁ ĚĂǇƐ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ <ƌƵŐĞƌ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů WĂƌŬ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ůŝĞƐ ĂůŽŶŐ DŽǌĂŵďŝƋƵĞ ?Ɛ
western border with South Africa, can earn a Mozambican poacher between $1,000 and 
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$5,000.31 However, the argument that poverty drives Mozambicans to poach in South Africa 
ŝŐŶŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ ƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? DŽǌĂŵďŝƋƵĞ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
framework, in particular, has contributed indirectly to poaching in South Africa because the 
penalties for involvement in poaching across the border have traditionally been minimal and 
the risks of being caught on return to Mozambique very low. Until the introduction of its 
2014 Biodiversity Law, rhino-related offences such as possession of horn were considered as 
misdemeanours, not as crimes with associated penalties. 32  In addition, many of the 
communities on the Mozambican side of the border have a history of alienation from the 
parks, many of which encompass territories and resources to which local communities once 
enjoyed access. As a result, communities can regard poaching as a legitimate form of 
resistance to state authority.33 In this case, IWT cannot simply be explained away as the sole 
result of economic deprivation.  
 
Furthermore, a look back at the dynamics of elephant poaching during the crisis of the mid-
1980s shows that even then poaching was not driven purely by poverty. In both East Africa 
in the 1980s and parts of Southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, the large-scale poaching 
witnessed was not simply the result of poorer communities seeking to make a small amount 
of money from ivory in order to survive. Such organised levels of poaching could not possibly 
have been carried out without corruption and complicity at the highest levels of 
government.34 Indeed, the involvement of the former South African Defence Force directly 
in poaching, as well as in trafficking, was clearly exposed and detailed in the report of the 
Kumleben Commission, post Apartheid.  
 
In 1995, Mr Justice Kumleben was appointed to head a commission of enquiry into the role 
played by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in poaching and wildlife trafficking during 
the 1980s. The resulting report detailed how the SADF used ivory, rhino horn, hardwoods 
and drugs to fund its wars and destabilisation campaigns in South West Africa (now 
Namibia), Angola and Mozambique.35 The example of Southern Africa in the 1980s is not 
unique, with extensive evidence attesting to the high-level corruption behind ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ
poaching crisis, as observed in Chapter V. In this context, it is crucial that poaching is not 
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considered simply as a symptom of absolute poverty amongst communities living around 
protected areas. 
 
This latter consideration points to the need to consider involvement in IWT beyond the 
poaching stage. Particularly at the next stages along the chain, it is crucial to acknowledge 
that IWT, and the corruption that comes with it, can constitute a regular source of income, 
whilst for others, it represents a safety net or a lucrative business opportunity.36 Here, it may 
be relative poverty that is more important as a driver, with individuals in many rural areas 
motivated predominantly by opportunities to seek the levels of material wealth associated 
with inclusion in the global economy (expressed through ownership of consumer goods such 
as mobile phones, televisions and vehicles).37 Though beyond the geographical focus of this 
paper, a 2008 report by TRAFFIC-Asia made exactly this point, concluding that the recent 
increase in illegal trading and smuggling of wildlife seen in Southeast Asia was not poverty-
related, but was instead directly related to a rise in household incomes. This study sought to 
examine the different stages in the trafficking chain, categories that also apply in sub-
Saharan Africa; from local-level rural harvesters, to professional hunters, traders, 
wholesalers and retailers. IWT provided varying forms of economic support along different 
stages of the network: as a source of regular income, a safety net or a profitable business 
venture.38 Clearly, participation in IWT at progressively higher stages of the chain to meet 
these expectations is not the same as that which occurs to meet the basic subsistence needs 
of communities at the harvesting stage.  
 
It is clear that poaching, development and human security are intertwined in more complex 
ways than the commonly invoked causal relationship would suggest. Indeed, the arguments 
positioning poaching as a straightforwardly negative force in relation to sustainable 
development and human security in source areas ignore the changing nature of poaching 
and trafficking, the immediate livelihoods demands on certain communities, and the range 
of other motivations and interests they may hold. These considerations are crucial to 
evaluating not only the adequacy of dominant narratives around the threat posed by 
poaching to human security, but also the effectiveness of policy responses. In source areas, 
these include a range of approaches, from those that seek to provide alternative livelihoods 
options, to those that seek to change the motivations and behaviours of poachers and 
                                                        
36
 TRAFFIC, tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ƌŝǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ tŝůĚůŝĨĞ dƌĂĚĞ ?  ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ǆƉĞƌƚ KƉŝŶŝŽŶ ŽŶ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů
Drivers of the Wildlife Trade and Trade Control Efforts in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR and Vietnam 
(Washington, DC: TRAFFIC International and World Bank, 2008; ZŽĞ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ‘tŚŝĐŚ ŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ Žƌ
ƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐŽĨŝŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ /ŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞtŚŝĐŚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŽĨWŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ? ?ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶNellemann et al. (eds), 
 ‘The Environmental Crime Crisis  W Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and 
Trade in Wildlife and FŽƌĞƐƚ ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ? UNEP Rapid Response Assessment, United Nations 
Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, Nairobi and Arendal, 2014. 
37
 ĂŶŝĞůt^ŚĂůůĞŶĚĞƌĂŶĚŽƵŐůĂƐDĂĐDŝůůĂŶ ? ‘WŽĂĐŚŝŶŐŝƐDŽƌĞdŚĂŶĂŶŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚWƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?
Conservation Letters (No. 7, 2014), pp. 484 W94. 
38
 TRAFFIC, tŚĂƚ ?ƐƌŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞtŝůĚůŝĨĞdƌĂĚĞ ?. 
members of local communities, and those that promote the use of greater levels of force in 
ĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽĂĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?39  
 
Policy Implications 
Poverty-alleviation and alternative livelihoods approaches, first, have increasingly been 
viewed as central in a range of responses to poaching and wildlife trafficking. These 
approaches align with a view of IWT as a threat to human security, in light of its destructive 
impact upon natural heritage of critical economic and touristic value. They also respond to a 
view of poverty as the main cause of poaching, the logical solution to which is that of 
developing economic alternatives for local, would-be poachers. Such responses seek to 
develop alternative income-generating options, including job creation or the disbursement 
of revenue from wildlife tourism schemes.40 
 
These approaches have underpinned initiatives such as Integrated Conservation and 
Development Projects  W conservation projects that contained a rural development 
component  W ĂŶĚůĂƚĞƌŵŽƌĞ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?-focused community conservation programmes 
such as Campfire in Zimbabwe and ADMADE in Zambia. These programmes seek to 
understand and tackle the structural and contextual factors that drive poorer communities 
to engage in poaching, however, they were increasingly criticised for the ways they 
intersects with existing community dynamics, often reinforcing hierarchies and failing to 
disburse benefits to the most marginalised and vulnerable community members. 41 Such 
approaches, remain anchored in a very narrow definition of poverty, conceived as a matter 
solely of economic deprivation. The result is that initiatives aiming to alleviate poverty or 
provide alternative livelihoods via income generation often have limited positive results  W 
precisely because they fail to tackle wider problems of inequality, the historical processes 
that led to the establishment of poaching as a crime or, crucially, the wider aspirations of 
poorer communities. These factors need to be more fully considered and integrated into any 
efforts to change the balance of incentives available to would-be poachers. This requires a 
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very different policy approach which seeks to address the aspirations of communities 
themselves, as well as engaging more fully with wider national and international 
development policies to reduce poverty and inequality (for further discussion see Duffy, St 
John, Buscher and Brockington, 2015). Rather than narrowly focusing on developing new 
models protected areas and wildlife management, it is important to place them in their 
broader social and political context.  
 
A related policy response is to change the balance of risk and reward associated with 
poaching. This response, similarly, rests on the idea that poachers exercise individual choice 
(or agency) when deciding whether to hunt (or not to hunt).42 For example, it is often 
assumed that an individual chooses to engage in poaching because they have decided that 
the potential rewards  W commonly conceived as a means of economic subsistence in a 
context of absolute poverty  W outweigh the potential risks. If we follow this logic, tackling 
poaching becomes a matter of increasing the rewards on offer for refraining from this 
activity, or increasing the risks and costs associated with it.  
 
In order to deter poachers, therefore, government and conservation agencies may seek to 
increase the benefits or rewards available in exchange for a reduction in poaching, such as 
direct payments, or investment in community projects such as schools, water pumps or 
grinding mills, as has occurred in the case of both Campfire and ADMADE.43 Government and 
other agencies may also seek to increase the risks of detection, arrest and imprisonment, 
such that greater levels of enforcement encourage compliance with the law and deter 
participation in poaching.44 Again, however, the effectiveness of such approaches is tied up 
closely with many of the issues discussed previously. These include the question of the 
extent to which poaching is conducted purely as a means of economic subsistence  W 
meaning that schemes such as direct payments would be considered attractive. On the 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ůŽĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ  ‘ƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ? ĂƐ ŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ? ƚŚĞ
deterrent effect of increased rewards for abstinence  W or greater penalties associated with 
participation in poaching  W is likely to be limited.  Instead, as Duffy, St John, Buscher and 
Brockington (2015) argue a better approach is to regard wildlife conservation as a 
development issue, and one that requires tackling inequality. 
  
A final policy option is to rely on an increased use of force to offer protection to wildlife 
populations from poachers, no matter their reasons for involvement in this activity. The 
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dramatic rise, since the mid-2000s, in poaching of elephants and rhinos for ivory and horn 
has prompted a more enthusiastic embrace of this option, commonly witnessed in a forceful 
response in terms of enforcement.45 Such militarised forms of anti-poaching are not new: 
there is a long history of co-operation between the military and conservation sectors and 
the integration of conservation initiatives into security agendas; early game wardens in 
British colonial administrations were often ex-military personnel.46 However, today this has 
reached a level not seen previously, as poachers have become more heavily armed, making 
greater use of sophisticated weaponry and technologies such as GPS, night-vision goggles 
and even helicopters. 47  As the militarised activities of poachers are matched by 
correspondently militarised responses, the result has increasingly been framed as an 
ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ǁĂƌĨŽƌǁŝůĚůŝĨĞ ? ?
 
Many conservation agencies and supporters of military-style conservation point to the need 
for increased use of force in encounters with heavily armed poachers prepared to shoot to 
kill both animals and rangers that get in their way. Indeed, rangers can often encounter 
heavily armed poachers during patrols, and rangers and poachers can and do regularly 
exchange shots, as demonstrated in the number of rangers killed in the course of anti-
poaching operations  W and even whilst carrying out the routine duties associated with 
managing protected areas. The Thin Green Line, an organisation that campaigns on behalf of 
rangers killed or wounded on duty, estimates that 1,000 rangers have been killed 
(worldwide) in the last ten years whilst carrying out their duties.48 This headline figure of 
1,000 is likely to be an underestimate given the patchiness of data collection and reporting 
of rangers killed in action in some countries.  
 
In this context, it is widely accepted that a robustly armed contribution to conservation is 
indispensable. To support this position, researchers Jasper Humphreys and M L R Smith 
ŝŶǀŽŬĞůĂƵƐĞǁŝƚǌ ?ǁŚŽǁƌŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝĨŽŶĞƐŝĚĞƵƐĞƐĨŽƌĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŵƉƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƚĞƌƌĞĚ
by the bloodshed it involves, while the other side refrains, the first will gain the upper 
ŚĂŶĚ ? ?49 This logic has underpinned the rise of what has come to resemble a niche variant of 
counter-insurgency in ungoverned spaces. Nir Kalron, a former Israeli paratrooper who runs 
Maisha ŽŶƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ?ƐǁŝůĚůŝĨĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ, sees his role as a holistic union of war and 
ǁŝůĚůŝĨĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ P ‘ƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝĞĨĞŶĐĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐƚŽĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŽŶĞ
of natural continuity: the standards and ethical code I was taught in special operations 
teams and the sense of fighting for just causes were and still are the core values that guide 
ŵĞ ? ?50 Similarly, former Coldstream Guards officer Ian Saunders of the Tsavo Trust promotes 
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professional anti-poaching units, trained to meet the specific challenges of their local area, 
which provide physical safety for ďŽƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞĂŶĚǁŝůĚůŝĨĞ ? ?51 
 
The growing inclination towards militarised counter-poaching is unsurprising given the 
fractured political and security situation in parts of the continent; the heightened rhetoric 
around high-value wildlife such as elephants and rhinos; and the large numbers of former 
military personnel who have consequently sought to bring their special brand of knowledge, 
honed in Afghanistan and elsewhere, to wildlife conservation. However, as might be 
expected, these enhanced protection strategies have drawn criticism, especially from those 
ǁŚŽĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŝƐƐƵĞ ?ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚŽŽ ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĞĚ ? ?ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂƚŝŶŐ
 ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŐƌĞĞŶ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚĞ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŝƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ
within a militaristiĐĚǇŶĂŵŝĐŽĨ  ‘ǁĞĂƉŽŶŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-poaching, and that 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ  ‘ǁĂƌ ?ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝƐƵŶŚĞůƉĨƵů ?Ɛ>ƵŶƐƚƌƵŵĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?
more militarised responses produce increasingly dangerous landscapes as state actors, 
private operators and poachers enter into conservation areas willing to engage in deadly 
force, and what follows is an inevitable cycle of escalation.52 This can have limited or even 
counterproductive impacts, particularly on human security.  
 
Indeed, while the juƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƵƐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƌĞůǇŽŶĂ ‘ƐĞůĨĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?
some operations use force proactively and as a means of pre-emption  W at times going as far 
as policies of shoot-to-kill  W rather than as a reaction to a distinct threat.53 The impact on 
human security is little considered; as Roe points out, communities can be negatively 
affected by heavy-handed militarised responses, which result in a proliferation of weapons 
and armed personnel in marginalised rural areas which may already be confronting 
insecurity. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo has experienced decades of 
military activity by a wide range of rebel groups and by government forces; in this context, 
armed anti-poaching units may simply be regarded as yet another militia, alienating and 
estranging communities rather than including them and giving them a stake in wildlife 
protection strategies.54  
 
Beyond this, narrowing the scope of the debate towards the moment that rangers 
encounter a possible threat (a group of armed poachers) fails to engage with the wider 
questions of whether this is an effective policy response in the longer term. A militarised 
approach may result in a short-term reduction in poaching, but may ultimately undermine 
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longer-term, community-based approaches. 55  This reflects the inability of militarised 
responses, alone, to engage with and tackle the complex social, political and economic 
contexts that produce illegal wildlife use in the first place. This can manifest itself in a failure 
to distinguish between poaching for profit and for subsistence,56 involving a failure to 
acknowledge that IWT is often orchestrated by organised criminal syndicates, sometimes 
through the co-option or coercion of hunters from poorer local communities, with additional 
negative effects on human security.57 In this context, an increased use of force can only 
hope to produce short-term results, to the possible detriment of longer-term ambitions to 
secure successful conservation via engagement with local people. Alone, it ignores the key 
question of how governments and conservation groups can devise ways for the benefits of 
wildlife conservation to be delivered to local communities  W questions that must be 
considered simultaneously. 
 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that there may be ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ǁĂƌ ? ĂŶĚ
militarisation of counter-poaching than those of animal protection and ranger self-defence  W 
with further impacts at community level. Indeed, securitising a topic is commonly seen to 
have several important effects: to make the issue a top-priority issue for policy-makers; and 
to make it one that demands urgent solutions, usually militarised ones.58 These effects can 
at times suit vested interests, an issue raised in relation to the situation in South Africa, 
where the militarisation of poaching and counter-poaching has perhaps extended to its 
furthest point. Here, the militarisation of anti-poaching received a boost from 2012 when 
General Johan Jooste (retired) became head of counter-ƉŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
parks. As he did, he declared his dismay that ^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌ ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ĨƌŽŵ ĂƌŵĞĚ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĚŚŝƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞǁĂƌƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĂƌŵĞĚďĂŶĚŝƚƐĂŶĚ
 ?ƚŽǁŝŶŝƚ ? ?59  
 
dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ‘ƌŚŝŶŽǁĂƌƐ ?ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞd as having been hijacked by 
a number of private interests. These relate to the fact that a significant proportion of South 
ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ƌŚŝŶŽƐ  Wa full quarter by one estimate  W live on private farms and ranches,60 
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providing numerous business opportunities for the South African farmer/rancher. South 
Africa is the only country (apart from a few permits issued in Namibia) to allow rhino 
hunting  W providing a different motivation for an uncompromising approach to their 
protection.61 Meanwhile, demand for rhino horn represents a potentially major financial 
opportunity for farmer/ranchers if international trade were to be legalised  W again pointing 
ƚŽĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚŝŵƵůƵƐĨŽƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĞĚƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ
fight against poaching has become big business for the array of fundraising organisations 
ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝƐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ĞŶĚůĞƐƐ ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ŽĨ ŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ ds ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ĂƚƚůĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ
ZŚŝŶŽtĂƌƐ ?62 and the already numerous private security companies that provide counter-
poaching and de facto help to fill the rural security void.63 These concerns have been 
outlined most forensically by journalist Julian Rademeyer, who argues that essentially South 
ĨƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ  ‘ƌŚŝŶŽ ǁĂƌƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ Ă ƐĞƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌ-ůŽĐŬŝŶŐ  ‘ŵŝŶŝ-ǁĂƌƐ ?  W64 one involving the 
protection of a high-profile animal (even though the motivations for this are a variety of 
conservation, combat, political and economic ones), and another between competing 
groups engaged in cynical and logistically complex strategies to cash in on a valuable 
resource. In all of this, the impact on development and the security of populations in and 
around source areas is little considered.  
 
In this context, it is clear that better, more effective and more socially just responses to the 
threat posed by poaching at local level are required, based around a more sophisticated 
understanding of how poaching and low-level trafficking impacts upon human security. This 
must involve recognition that these activities may have positive as well as negative impacts 
on human security, in the shorter as well as the longer term. In cases where poaching is an 
important part of subsistence or income-generating strategies for poorer communities, 
policy-makers must provide alternatives that genuinely address the aspirations of 
communities, rather than simply providing income or employment opportunities. They must 
also be aware of the potentially negative impacts of militarised responses on human 
security; the ultimate risk is that these approaches alienate the very communities upon 
which successful, long-term conservation ultimately relies.  
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